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Complementarity of Trade and FDI Liberalization in Industrial 
Growth:  Lessons from Sri Lanka 
 
 
Abstract:  This paper examines industrialisation experience in Sri Lanka following the 
market-oriented policy reforms initiated in 1977, with emphasis on the complementarity 
of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) policies in shaping the reform outcome. It is 
found that the reforms helped to transform a primary product exporting economy into 
one in which manufactures dominate exports. Improved performance of domestic 
manufacturing through greater export orientation saw improvement in output and total 
factor productivity growth, and employment generation. The Sri Lankan experience 
highlights the complementary role of investment liberalisation for exploiting the 
potential gains from trade liberalisation. This industrialisation outcome is particularly 
impressive given that it occurred during a period of persistent civil strife and 
macroeconomic instability.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
With India breaking out from the “Hindu rate of growth’ following the implementation of major 
policy reforms, the overall developmental outcome in Sri Lanka – the pioneer of policy 
liberalization in South Asia – has thrown into sharper relief.  After a promising start, both in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1977 liberalisation and then again after the ‘second wave of 
liberalisation’ in 1991/92, economic performance in Sri Lanka has fallen well below 
expectations, though the economy has now become the most open economy in South Asia.1 
There is a palpable sense of mass dissatisfaction and disillusionment with political leadership 
across the whole political spectrum, and the country veers from one major political and 
constitutional crisis to another.2 As Sri Lanka’s dream of emulating the East Asian tigers – the 
stated goal of successive post-1977 governments – has receded, concerns and questions about 
the efficacy and impact of policy reforms have re-emerged.  In particular, the merits of trade 
liberalisation as a means of achieving industrial growth and employment generation are being 
called into question.  The political climate has become more receptive to calls for more 
‘nationalistic’ and protectionist policies with the growth of popular disenchantment with the 
mainstream political parties, both of which have (despite occasional backsliding) implemented 
progressive trade liberalisation.  Though major domestic and international constraints make it 
unlikely that there will be a sharp reversal of policies to embrace more closed-door policies 
appears unlikely, a backlash against liberalisation can not only make further progress in this 
direction more problematic but, more importantly, lead to misleading policy prescriptions that 
can perpetuate and aggravate current problems. 
                                                          
1 See for example, World Bank (2000:1) that praised Sri Lanka’s ‘good macroeconomic management 
and progress in trade liberalization, privatisation, and financial sector reform’. In 2001 the country 
experienced the first episode of negative growth since the 1930s and, given a chronic fiscal deficit 
problem, the sustainability of subsequent recovery remains quite fragile.   
2 One indicator of the dissatisfaction with the political establishment is the increase in support for the 
Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples’ Liberation Front – JVP) that espouses a mix of economic 
nationalist rhetoric and Sinhala nationalism, which has become a major partner in the current coalition 
government. The JVP emerged in the late 1960s as a Maoist influenced Sinhala rural youth based 
movement. It led two unsuccessful armed youth uprisings in 1971 and 1989 but has been operating as a 
legal political party since the mid-1990s. 
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In this context, understanding the causes of Sri Lanka’s developmental failure, at least in 
terms of its inability to match expectations, through a systematic, in-depth assessment of past 
policies and strategies is certainly both necessary and welcome. Because it has experimented 
with a wide variety of policy regimes – from open, ‘non-interventionist’, free market policies 
(up to 1959/60) through dirigiste import substitution industrialisation (ISI) (1960-1977) to 
export oriented liberalisation (post-1977) - Sri Lanka is an almost ideal case study for analysis 
of the determinants of economic growth.  Its initial conditions were probably unsurpassed in 
any other developing country in Asia in terms of various growth-promoting factors which are 
now widely accepted in the growth literature. Many analysts (such as Wriggins 1960) described 
newly-independent Sri Lanka as a country with a vibrant, multi-party and multi-ethnic political 
system, a free press, a strong trade union movement and political institutions, honed by more 
than a century of British tutelage in which it had learnt to accommodate social divisions and 
communal differences.3  There was an efficient, ‘clean’ public service and a well-functioning 
legal system. Property rights were well established and enforceable. While lacking significant 
natural resources (minerals, oil etc), it had thriving agricultural export industries, good 
commercial networks with international linkages, and enjoyed a favourable and strategic 
geographical location on the transport route between Europe and Asia/Oceania, with long 
established modern port facilities in Colombo – the capital and commercial hub of the country. 
A well-developed network of roads, railways and communications facilities complemented the 
strategic assets linking the country to foreign markets.  
In this paper, we examine the Sri Lankan experience with economic liberalisation 
reforms, focusing on the process of industrialisation, rather than on economic growth in general.  
In particular, we focus on the policy influences on manufacturing industry performance, with 
particular attention to the impact of trade and investment liberalisation, highlighting the 
synergistic interaction between the two and drawing out the implications for broader economic 
growth. The significance of this interaction effect suggests that downplaying the importance of 
trade and investment opening up may be very costly.4  The nature and importance of such 
interactions are of course central concerns in the current growth literature. Given the limited 
scope of this paper, we do not attempt here to address the broader task of analysing the overall 
growth performance. However, this is part of our broader research agenda to assess the overall 
growth experience of Sri Lanka taking into account the interaction of economic policies (those 
associated with economic liberalisation per se as well as many others implemented as part of 
the overall government policy packages) with institutions and both domestic and external 
exogenous developments.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 briefly chronicles the industrial policy 
in Sri Lanka since independence, followed by a discussion on the key elements of trade and 
investment policy reforms initiated in 1977.  Section 3 examines the industrialization 
experience since 1977 from a historical perspective, placing emphasis on aspects such as 
patterns of industrial growth, export orientation, factor productivity growth and employment 
generation.  Section 4 analyses of the response of foreign direct investors to the significant 
trade-cum-investment liberalisation reforms and the pivotal role they played in the process of 
export-oriented industrialisation.  The final section summarises the main findings.  
 
                                                          
3 Sri Lanka has a majority Sinhalese population (>70 per cent), with two major minority groups, Tamils 
(about 20 per cent ) and Moors (about 7 per cent). Sinhalese are mostly Buddhists, Tamils, Hindus and 
Moors, Muslims. Significant minorities within both Sinhalese and Tamil communities are Christians. 
4 Rodrick (2003), for example asserts that ‘trade – or, more specifically, government policies toward 
trade – does not play nearly as important a role as the institutional setting. 
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2 The Policy Context 
During the first decade after independence in 1948, Sri Lanka (commonly called Ceylon until 
1972) continued to remain an open trading nation with only relatively minor trade or exchange 
rate restrictions and liberal domestic policies.5  From the late 1950s, a combination of change in 
political leadership and balance of payments difficulties led to the adoption of a state-led 
import-substitution development strategy. Trade restrictions, which were initially introduced in 
response to growing balance of payments difficulties (rather than as part of an ideological 
commitment to import substitution industrialisation), became transformed into key instruments 
for directing private sector production activities in line with (perceived) national priorities. 
Following a hesitant and mild liberalization attempt during 1968-70, the period from 1970 to 
1977 saw further government intervention in the economy under the guise of creating a 
‘socialist society’.  Significant and ever increasing segments of trade, industry, agriculture and 
banking were owned and managed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In fact, in her attempts to 
expand and consolidate the role of the state in the economy (and consequently to marginalise 
the private sector), Sri Lanka went far beyond neighbouring India. In an environment in which 
import licensing was pervasive but licenses were scarce, and imported inputs were a critical 
determinant of the level of output of industrial firms, government officials held power of profit 
and loss over domestic import-substituting producers. By the mid-1970s the Sri Lankan 
economy was one of the most inward-oriented and regulated economies outside the communist 
block, characterized by stringent trade and exchange controls and pervasive state interventions 
in all areas of economic activity.  
 
The foreign investment policy continued to remain extremely liberal until the mid-1960s, 
permitting many MNEs set up affiliates within Sri Lanka to undertake the domestic production 
of items previously supplied from their overseas production centres.   However, as the ISI 
strategy was reaching a crisis point by the mid-1960s, the view (which was widely-held among 
development economists at the time) that ‘import-substituting MNEs worsen countries' balance of 
payments’ (Little 1982: 185) began to dominate Sri Lanka's policy towards FDI.. This view 
resulted in a dualistic foreign investment policy characterised by stringent restrictions on 
import-substitution projects and favoured treatments for export-oriented ventures. A White 
Paper on the treatment of foreign investment issued in 1966 emphasised the important role that 
MNEs can play in the process of manufactured export expansion by providing easy access to 
foreign markets and bringing in experience and expertise in many complex facets of product 
development and international marketing. On these grounds, the White Paper introduced 
various tax concessions for export-oriented foreign ventures and relaxed foreign exchange 
restrictions on the remittance of dividends, interest and profit originating in such ventures. The 
government's commitment to the promotion of export-oriented foreign direct investment 
(EOFDI) was reaffirmed and further production and tax incentives were introduce by the Five-
Year Plan, 1972-77 (Government of Sri Lanka 1972). 
 
 However, this policy shift in favour of EOFDI occurred in an overall policy and political 
context which was highly unfavourable to private sector activities in general and to export 
production in particular.  Reflecting the cumulative impact of stringent trade controls, high export 
taxes and the overvalued exchange rate, the overall incentive structure of the economy was 
characterised by a significant “anti-export bias” throughout this period (Athukorala and 
Rajapatirana, 2000).  There was an import duty rebate scheme (designed to provide export-oriented 
manufacturers with access to global inputs at border prices) in operation from 1964.  But because 
                                                          
5  Sri Lanka’s post-independence policy history has been well documented.  See, for instance, Snodgrass (1996 and 
1998), Lal and Rajapatirana (1989), Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994), Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2000). 
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of stringent performance requirements and bureaucratic red tape in operation, the scheme played 
virtually no role in removing the anti-export bias of the restrictive trade regime. Moreover, during 
the period from 1970 to 1977, widespread nationalisation measures and threats, coupled with 
various economic controls, effectively marginalised the private sector in the economy.   
 
The policy makers in Sri Lanka, like their counterparts in other developing countries, 
expected import-substitution industrialisation to set the stage for self-sustained growth by 
reduce the heavy dependence of the economy on imports. The reality was quite different, 
however. While consumer goods imports were reduced substantially, this was achieved at the 
expense of increased reliance on imported capital goods and raw materials, resulting, contrary 
to expectation, in an even more rigid dependence on imports.  Given these structural features, 
the growth dynamism of the newly established industrial sector tended to show a close 
functional relationship with the fortunes of the traditional export industries. Thus, unanticipated 
import curtailments brought about by foreign exchange scarcity turned out to be the main 
constraint on industrial expansion since the late 1960s. Moreover, the ‘inefficiency slipover 
effects” of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in intermediate good production on private 
sector end-user industries were quite substantial, particularly since import compression policies 
were implemented with a distinct bias towards SOEs in the allocation of foreign exchange 
(Athukorala and Jayasuriya 1993, 100).  In most smaller developing countries, rapid expansion 
of domestic industry continued until the “easy” import-substitution opportunities (i.e. meeting 
domestic demand in textiles, footwear, some food processing and other light labour intensive 
activities) were used up.  It was only then that the cost of additional investment in new import 
substitution activities begun to rise and growth slowed down (Krueger 1992, 43-4).  However, 
in Sri Lanka, a limit was set on the growth of industry by the balance of payments constraint 
well before the completion of the easy IS phase. 
 As a reaction to the dismal economic outcome of the inward-looking policy, Sri Lanka 
embarked on an extensive economic liberalization process in 1977, becoming the first country 
in the South Asian region to do so.  The first round of reforms during 1977-79 included a 
significant trade reform: replacing quantitative restrictions on imports with tariffs and revising 
the tariff structure to achieve greater uniformity; reducing restrictions on foreign investment, 
with new incentives for export-oriented foreign investment under an attractive Free Trade Zone 
(FTZ) scheme; financial reform: adjusting interest rates to levels above the rate of inflation, 
opening the banking sector to foreign banks and freeing credit markets to determine interest 
rates; limits on public sector participation in the economy and a program for pivatisation of 
public enterprises, exchange rate realignment and incentives for nontraditional exports.   
 
The reform process lost momentum in the early 1980s, first because of an unfortunate 
shift in policy priorities towards politically appealing investment projects, and subsequently due 
to the onset of the ethnic conflict (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 1993, Ch. 5).  There was, 
however, no retreat to the old control regime.  In a decisive move to infuse momentum into the 
unfinished reform process, a significant ‘second wave’ liberalization package was implemented 
in the early 1990s. This included an ambitious privatization program, further tariff cuts and 
simplification of the tariff structure, removing exchange controls on current account 
transactions and several important changes to the foreign investment policy framework in line 
with the increased outward orientation of the economy.  
 
After 17 years in government, the reformist United National Party (UNP) lost power at 
the 1994 general elections to the Peoples’ Alliance (PA). Since then the political climate has 
become more volatile and receptive to calls for more ‘nationalistic’ and protectionist policies 
with the growth of popular disenchantment with the mainstream political parties. However, 
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there has been the convergence in broad economic policies among the major political parties 
and groupings; maintaining greater openness to trade and FDI is now a bipartisan policy in Sri 
Lanka.   This policy convergence, coupled with a palpable shift in development thinking in 
favour of greater outward orientation world over, a sharp reversal of policies to embrace more 
closed-door policies appears unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
 
With this background we now discuss the key elements of the trade and foreign 
investment policy regimes in Sri Lanka as they have evolved since 1977. 
 (a) Trade Policy  
Trade policy reform was the key element of the economic liberalisation policy package 
introduced in 1977. In November 1977 quantitative import restrictions on imports, which were 
near universal, were supplanted by a revised system of tariff, retaining only 280 items under 
license. While many of the tariff changes involved a gazetted increase in the rate, tariffication 
typically involved a sharp reduction in the degree of protection provided previously by the 
stringent QR regime. Fine-tuning of tariff rates during the next ten years involved some 
selective tariff increases in response to demand by the domestic protectionist lobby.  There were 
also some moderate revenue oriented across-the-board increases in import duty in some years.  
These setbacks notwithstanding, overall there was significant rationalisation of the tariff 
structure, both in terms of reducing variability of individual rates and the average level.   
 
As part of the ‘second-wave’ liberalisation reforms initiated in the late 1980s, import tariffs 
were further reduced with the aim of moving towards a three-band tariff structure involving 
rates of 10, 20 and 35 percent.  In 1997 tariffs on textiles were abolished and tariffs on clothing 
imports were substantially reduced, with a view to facilitating further expansion of the booming 
garment industry. Trade liberalisation suffered some setback in because of additional fiscal 
pressures following the escalation of the civil war in the latter part of the 1990s and economic 
downturn during 2001 which infused a new lease of life to the domestic protectionist lobby.  A 
40 per cent across-the-board tariff surcharge (subsequently reduced to 20 per cent in 2001) was 
introduced in 2000. There were also many ad hoc duty exceptions and case-by-case adjustment 
of duties on many industrial imports which directly compete with domestic production. The 
tariff structure has also become more complex with the introduction of preferential tariffs under 
the South Asian Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) and the India Sri Lanka Free Trade 
Agreement (ISLFTA).  However, as we will see below, these changes have not resulted in a 
significant reversal in the trends of economic opening maintained over the past two decades.  
 
Side by side with import liberalisation, export expansion was accorded high priority in 
the 1977 reform package.  The new export development strategy had two key elements; an 
export processing zone (EPZ) which provided full export oriented firms with virtual free-trade 
status (to be discussed later in this section), and a wide raging export development scheme 
implemented by the newly established  Sri Lanka Export Development Board (SLEDB) for 
non-EPZ firms.  The SLEDB program included a duty rebate scheme, direct cash subsidies, 
manufacturing-in-bond, provision of equity and working capital to firms with export potential, 
and various measures aimed at product and market development, were introduced under the 
newly established.  In 1980, the operation of the duty rebate scheme (originally introduced in 
1964 but largely inactive because of various administrative rigidities) was transferred from the 
Ministry of Industries to SLEDB.  The SLEDB completely reformulated the scheme an 
instituted a more flexible implementation procedure  to cover all non-traditional exports using 
imported inputs.  The coverage of the duty rebate scheme was expanded in 1982 to include sales 
to EPZs.  Manufacturing-in-bonds for exporters importing material for re-export as part of a 
finished good, a cash grant scheme based on annual export increments, and concessionary credit 
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for exporters were among the other SLEDB incentives.  Over time, the use of the duty rebate 
scheme (and other arrangement for exempting exporters from duties on imported inputs) 
declined because of substantial reduction of tariffs on intermediate goods (including freeing of 
textiles imports from duty), and more importantly, the extension of EPZ privileges to export-
oriented firms located outside EPZ.6   The latter policy initiative also set the stage for scaling 
down, and the subsequent elimination, of various financial incentives offered by the SLEDB to 
non-EPZ firms, limiting the role of the SLEDB only to providing  some export facilitating 
services.  
 
The effective duty rate on total imports (duty collection as a percentage of CIF import 
value) increased from about 14 per cent during 1978-80 to 18.6 per cent by the mid-1980s  and 
then declined continuously over the ensuing years reaching 4.6 per cent by 2002 (Table 1).  The 
share of dutiable imports in total imports ranged between 52-77 per cent during 1978-84, and 
declined continuously during the ensuing years.   By the late 1990s, only 30 per cent of imports 
(in value terms) were subject to duties.7   
Interestingly, the sharp reduction in the average import duty over the past one-and-a-half 
decades has come predominantly from reductions (or elimination) of tariffs on intermediate 
goods.  During the post reforms period until about the mid 1980s, tariffs on intermediate goods 
were generally higher than those on final goods (consumer goods and investment goods).   From 
then on, tariffs on intermediate goods have declined at a much faster rate compared to those on 
final goods.  In the early 1990, consumer goods tariffs were on average about two times higher 
than tariffs on the intermediate goods.  Given this pattern of tariff escalation, the effective 
protection for domestic manufacturing turned out to be much higher than the nominal tariff on 
final goods.   
 
The available official estimates of effective rate of protection (ERP) for domestic market 
oriented manufacturing are given in Table 2.   According to these estimates, the effective rate of 
protection (ERP) for import-competing manufacturing has declined persistently over the past 
decade but still remained high (56 per cent) by 2002.  There are no separate estimates of ERP 
for export-oriented production, which can be used in combination with ERP for domestic 
production, to assess the degree of export bias involved in the structure of protection.    
 
However, as already noted, throughout the post-reform period, the trade regime in Sri 
Lanka continued to provide export-producers with free access to intermediate inputs under the 
EPZ scheme and an all-encompassing duty rebate scheme for non-EPZ firms.  In addition, EPZ 
firms benefited from a wide range of financial incentives (see Section 2(b)).   Therefore, we can 
reasonably infer that the continuing high effective protection for domestic market oriented 
production may not have been a major deterrent to export expansion.  The conventional view 
that an import tax is equivalent to a tax on export production (Lerner’s symmetry theorem) is 
based on the assumption that both export-producing and import-competing industries directly 
compete for the same resources which are fully employed.  However, the process of 
manufacturing for export in Sri Lanka, as in the East Asian NIEs at the initial stage of export-
led growth, primarily involved combining imported inputs with ‘surplus’ labour (mostly women 
workers who were not part of the traditional manufacturing labour force).  Thus, export 
                                                          
6 Total duty rebate payment in 2003 was 240 million rupees (2 per cent of total value of manufactured 
exports), down from over a 2 billion (18 per cent) in the early 1990s. 
7 The significant decline in the share of dutiable imports reflects the expansion of manufactured exports. 
Firms operating under EPZ provisions are eligible to import all inputs duty-free, and other firms 
producing for exports are provided duty-free access to imported inputs through the duty rebate scheme 
or the bonded warehouse facility. 
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expansion could occur even though the policy regime – with high protection for import 
competing production – seemed to impart a pronounced anti-export bias by conventional 
criteria.   
 
(b) FDI Policy 
Promotion of foreign investment, particularly in export-oriented manufacturing, has been a 
pivotal element of Sri Lanka’s market oriented policy reforms since 1977.  The most important 
aspect of the new FDI policy was the setting up of the Greater Colombo Economic Commission 
(GCEC) in 1978 with wide-ranging power to establish and operate Export Processing Zones.8      
The investment promotion policy package offered by the GCEC to EPZ investors included 
allowing complete foreign ownership of investment projects; a tax holiday for up to 10 years 
with complete tax exemption for remuneration of foreign personnel employed, royalties, and 
dividends of shareholders during that period; duty exemption for the importation of inputs and 
assistance with customs clearances; industrial services at subsidised rates and unlimited access 
to foreign-currency credit at interest rates prevailing in world financial markets. Access to 
foreign financing though FCBUs and other incentives. The international news media and the 
investment community rated the Sri Lankan EPZ incentives highly favourably. 9   
As an important part of the DFI policy, steps were also taken to enter into Investment 
Protection Agreements and Double Taxation Relief Agreements with the major investing 
countries.  A guarantee against nationalisation of foreign assets without compensation was 
provided under the Article 157 of the new Constitution of Sri Lanka adopted in 1978. 
Until 1990, there was no major change in the policy towards non-FTZ foreign ventures. 
Majority local ownership continued to be the general rule for approving such projects.   Even 
though more liberal ownership criteria (even up to 100 per cent foreign ownership) were applied 
in approving export-oriented firms, these firms were not eligible for the lucrative incentives 
offered to EPZ firms. As part of the second-wave liberalization, a new Investment Policy 
Statement announced in 1990 with several important changes to the foreign investment policy 
framework in line with the increased outward orientation of the economy.  Activities of FIAC 
and GCEC were brought together under a new Board of Investment (BOI) in order to facilitate 
and speed up investment approval within a uniforeign fimsd policy framework applicable to 
both import-substituting and export-oriented investors. Restrictions on the ownership structures 
of joint-venture projects outside EPZs were abolished. EPZs privileges were extended to local 
investors who establish new export-oriented projects in all parts of the country were given free-
trade status (in addition to the area demarcated EPZs) This provision, which was initially 
applicable only to investors who were prepared to implement their projects prior to 30 
September 1991, was extended in February 1993 to local investors staring new export ventures 
as well as existing companies which set up production facilities outside the Western Province. 
Since then, this has become a permanent feature of the BOI approval procedure.  
                                                          
8 The first EPZ, at Katunakaye near the Colombo International  Airport (henceforth KEPZ) was opened 
in 1978. The remarkable success of the KEPZ  paved the way for setting up of a second EPZ in 
Biyagama (BEPZ) in 1982 and a third in Koggala (KGEPZ) in June 1991. 
9 Asian Wall Street Journal (23 September 1980) reported the Managing Director of Lehman Brothers as 
saying, ‘I do not see what more an investor could want than Sri Lanka has to offer’. In a comparison of 
relative labour productivity (which combined both efficiency and wage cost) of Asian workers appeared in 
Business Asia( 2 June, 1978) , Sri Lanka (42) was placed ahead of the Philippines (41), Taiwan (34), Korea 
(21) and India (12), and only next to Singapore (47) (Business Asia, June 2, 1978).  The Far Eastern 
Economic Review (23 October 1978) dubbed Sri Lanka ‘the new investment centre in Asia’. 
 
ASARC Working Paper 2004-10 
8 
(c ) Accompanying Policies and the Investment Climate 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the liberalisation reforms initiated in 
1977 have resulted in a significant opening of the Sri Lankan economy.  The reform process has 
been successful in virtually eliminating quantitative restrictions, reinforcing tariff as the main 
instruments for regulating import trade.  Tariff levels have also come down over the years. 
Export producers were provided with duty free access to implored inputs from the very 
beginning of the reform process.   Liberalisation of the foreign investment regime has gone in 
hand in hand with trade liberalisation.   Before proceeding to assessing the impact of these 
significant reforms, it important to consider the other elements of the reform process which 
have a bearing on manufacturing performance.  While there is no consensus on the timing and 
sequencing of these accompanying reforms, it is generally believed that the ability of a country 
to capture the full benefit of trade and investment liberalisation depends crucially on the 
concurrent liberalisation of domestic commodity, financial and labour markets, and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability (Krueger 1984, Michaely et al 1991).   
The liberalisation reforms in Sri Lanka involved dismantling of various price controls 
and state trading monopolies. The proposed privatisation/rationalisation of state-owned 
manufacturing enterprises lost much of its rigour in the process of implementation for political 
economy reasons, but successfully implanted as part of the second-wave liberalisation.   With 
the privatisation of SOEs a major impediment to trade liberalisation and a source of pressure 
policy reversal has been weakened.   However, implementations of reforms in other areas fell 
well short of what was proposed in the original reform package.  For instance, in the area of 
domestic financial sector reforms, the reforms never went beyond some limited opening of the 
banking sector to partial the entry of foreign banks and permitting domestic banks to operate 
foreign currency banking units. Proposals to reform labour legislation and the institutional 
mechanism for wage setting were abandoned in the face of strong resistance and legal 
challenges by the trade unions (Weerakoon 1996).  
 
The 1997 reform package was formulated with due emphasis on the complementarity 
between macroeconomic management and the trade liberalization outcome.  Thus, trade 
liberalization was accompanied by a significant exchange rate reform. The dual exchange rate 
system, which had been in operation since 1968, was abolished and the new uniforeign fimsd 
rate was placed under a managed float. The exchange rate was planned to be adjusted daily to 
reflect changes in foreign exchange market conditions.  The other elements of the 
macroeconomic policy mix included a significant interest rate reform and a number of measures 
to ensure fiscal prudence. The latter measures included attempts to reduce the budget deficit 
(which had been the major source of macroeconomic imbalance) through significant cuts in 
various consumer and producer subsidies, restraints on budgetary transfers to state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and limits on inflationary financing of the budget deficit.   
The policy commitment to sound macroeconomic management was short lived, 
however.  Government policies soon resulted in the generation of inflationary pressures. The 
chief source of macroeconomic instability and pressure on the real exchange rate in the early 
post-reform period was a massive public sector investment program that included the Mahaweli 
scheme, a billion-dollar multipurpose irrigation project, a large public housing program and an 
urban development program (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 1993).  The Central Bank 
intensiforeign fimsd its intervention in the foreign exchange market and eventually abandoned 
(in November 1982) the practice of determining the exchange rate daily. From the mid-1980s, 
the escalation of the civil war begun to hamper the government’s attempt to maintain 
macroeconomic stability.   As the widening budget deficit became the major source of 
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macroeconomic instability, the Central Bank naturally succumbed to using the nominal 
exchange rate as an ‘anchor’ for inflation control.  Consequently, the significant real exchange 
rate depreciation achieved in the immediate aftermaths of the economic opening gradually 
dissipated in the ensuing years, with the exception of a short-lived improvement achieved 
through greater nominal exchange rate flexibility during 1990-94 (Table 3). 
In sum, the preconditions required for benefiting from trade and investment 
liberalisation were missing during much of the post-reform period, except for two sub-periods, 
1977-82 and 1990-94, with political stability needed for capturing the full benefits of economic 
liberalization was largely missing for much of the remainder of the post reform period.  Thus, 
Sri Lanka provides us with an interesting case study to examine whether an outward-oriented 
policy regime could yield a superior industrialization outcome compared to a controlled regime, 
even in the absence of required complementary reforms and under severe strains of the war.  
 
3. Manufacturing Performance  
 (a) Growth trends 
 
At the time of independence in 1948, Sri Lanka was a prime example of an export economy 
dependent on a limited range of agricultural export commodities (Snodgrass 1996).  The 
production patterns exhibited only limited changes during the import-substation era.  The 
manufacturing share in GDP increased from 5.6 per cent in the early 1960s to 9 per cent by the 
end of the decade and was around 11 per cent by the time of 1977 policy reforms (Table 4).   
 
The manufacturing sector entered a rapid growth phase following the 1977 reforms.  
However, the share of manufacturing in total GDP remained more or less unchanged around 11 
per cent until the mid-1980s. This was mostly a reflection of the superior growth performance 
of non-tradable sectors– construction, transport, utilities, trade and other services sectors– 
propelled by the public sector investment boom. Since the late 1980s the pattern changed; in 
most years, manufacturing growth has surpassed that of other sectors.  As a result, the 
manufacturing share in GDP increased from 10 per cent in the early 1980s to over 16 per cent 
by the mid-1990s.   During 1978-2000 manufacturing output grew at an average annual rate of 
8.5 per cent, compared to 4.8 per cent during the decade preceding the reforms.   As a result, the 
manufacturing share in GDP increased from 11 per cent in the early 1980s to 18 per cent by the 
late 1990.  Since the mid-1980s, there has been an increasingly close relationship between 
manufacturing growth and GDP growth.10    
 
However, manufacturing growth has not been uniform over past two decades.  There 
was considerable volatility and periodic fluctuation in growth, reflecting policy shifts and 
changes in the overall investment climate (mostly associated with the course of the protracted 
civil war).  The most impressive growth performance was in the first half of the 1990s when 
there was firm political commitment to reforms, macroeconomic conditions were relatively 
favorable and the debilitating effect of the civil war had been temporarily brought under control 
through an informal truce. Unfortunately, the resumption of the civil war and its impact on both 
macroeconomic stability and country-risk perceptions, the lack of clear policy directions, 
coupled with adverse developments in global markets in the aftermaths of the 1997-98 East 
Asian crisis constrained manufacturing performance during 1995-2001. The average annual 
manufacturing growth declined from 9.5 per cent during 1990-95 to 6.0 per cent during 1996-
2001. 
                                                          
10 The correlation coefficient between two annual growth rates for the period 1986-2000 is 0.72, 
compared to 0.35 for 1960-96. 
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 The major immediate cause of output expansion in the liberalized economy was the free 
availability of imported inputs and capital goods.  In particular, the availability of intermediate 
inputs contributed to output growth through greater capacity utilization.  However, output has 
continued to expand at an increasing rate even after the capacity utilization reached an average 
stable rate of about 70 per cent by the late 1980s.  Quite apart from greater input usage, growth 
of factor productivity seems to have played a significant role with some time lag.  
 
The results of a simple growth accounting procedure undertaken to decompose 
manufacturing output growth in to the relative contributions of factor accumulation and total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth are reported in Table 5.11  The estimates clearly point to the 
adverse productivity implications of the increased restrictiveness in the trade regime between 
1966 and 1974. In the early post-liberalisation period (1977-81) output growth emanated 
predominantly from factor accumulation facilitated by the free availability of imported inputs 
and capital goods in the liberalised economy.  In particular, the availability of intermediate 
inputs contributed to output growth through greater capacity utilisation. There was, however, a 
significant improvement in TFP growth between 1981 and 1995, recording an annual average 
rate of 7.5 per cent.  Out of total output growth between these two years, almost 30 per cent 
came from TFP growth.  However, TFP growth slowed to an annual average rate of 1.2 per cent 
during 1995-2000, reflecting the adverse domestic and external factors already noted.    
 
At the time of market oriented policy reforms in 1977, SOEs accounted for over 60 per 
cent of manufacturing output and 50 per cent of manufacturing employment. This public sector 
dominance continued virtually unchanged until about the mid-1980s. From about the mid-1980s 
the position of SOEs continuously eroded in face of rapid output growth in private sector 
ventures and privatization of an increasing number of SOEs in the 1990s.  SOEs accounted for a 
less than 3 per cent of total manufacturing output by the turn of the century.12
 
The response of private sector manufacturing to the new policy environment has 
exhibited rather contrasting patterns across sectors (Table 6 and 7).  As one would  anticipate, 
labour-intensive, export-oriented sectors, wearing apparel, footwear, rubber goods and leather 
products indicated impressive growth performance and TFP growth.   The only import-
substitution production sector, which has generally recorded increase in output and employment 
shares, was food and beverages.  The share of  clothing  in total manufacturing value added and 
employment increased form less that 10 per cent in the mid-1980s to over 35 per cent by the 
mid 1990s.   In recent years, the production structure has become more diversiforeign fimsd as 
domestic market oriented industries gradually developed market niches in the new liberalized 
economy and some new export-oriented industries (in particular natural rubber-based products, 
ceramics, footwear and travel goods) gradually expanded.    
 
The overall export orientation of manufacturing tended to increase sharply from the mid-
1980s (Table 3).  The ‘export coefficient’ (the ratio of exports to gross manufacturing output) 
increased from a mere 3 per cent in the late 1970s to over 50 per cent by the late 1980s and over 
70 per cent by the late 1990s.   
  
                                                          
11 The estimates are based on the Tornquist method. The only assumption required to justify its use is 
that firms pursue profit maximization and/or cost minimization, and hence market return is a good 
approximation to the marginal product of a factor.  No assumption about the properties of the underlying 
production function is required: production parameters are taken to be subsumed in expenditure (input) 
and revenue (output) (Harberger 1996). 
12 The data used in this paper, unless otherwise indicated, come from the Central bank of Sri Lanka, 
Annual Report. 
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(b) Trends and patterns of Manufactured Exports 
By the time of 1977 policy reform, the share of manufactures in total merchandise exports was 
only 5 per cent (Table 8). Since then, manufactured goods have emerged as the most dynamic 
element in the export structure.  Exports of manufactured goods grew (in current US$ terms) at 
an annual compound rate of over 30 per cent during 1978-2002, lifting their share in total 
exports to over 70 per cent.  The value of total manufacturing exports increased from a mere 
$5.0 million in the mid-1960s to over $4 billion by the late 1990s. During 1985-2000, Sri Lanka 
was among the top five low-income countries in terms of both the average annual growth in 
earnings from manufactured exports and the increase in manufacturing share in total 
merchandise exports (UNCTAD 2002). 
 
Manufactured exports of Sri Lanka are heavily concentrated in a single standard labour 
intensive consumer good, clothing.  However, from the late 1980s, there has been a noticeable 
increase in exports of other labour intensive products such as electronics (included under the 
commodity category of ‘machinery’), leather goods, footwear, toys, plastic products, jewellery, and 
resource-based products related to the traditional agricultural exports (tea, rubber and coconut 
fibre).  Reflecting this ongoing pattern of commodity diversification, the share of clothing in total 
manufacturing exports declined from 72 per cent in the early 1980s to 60 per cent in the mid- 
1990s (Table 8).  The share of natural rubber (the second largest of the traditional ‘trio’) in total 
exports has declined sharply (reaching less than one per cent in 2002) as a result of rapid growth 
of rubber based manufactured products. 
 
Given the dominance of textile and clothing in domestic manufacturing and the 
important role played by ‘quota-hopping’ investors in the expansion of the industry, the likely 
implications of the abolition of the MFA has become a key concern in Sri Lanka.  However, it 
appears that while some exporting firms are still involved in the production of low-end products 
for quota protected markets, overall the Sri Lanka textile and clothing industry appears now to 
be relatively well positioned to cope with the new challenges.   
 
Concurrent liberalisation of trade and FDI regime seems to have provided Sri Lanka 
with an environment which is conducive for improvement in product quality, marketing stills, 
and rapid penetration in brad-names dominated high end of the global markets.   As we will see 
below, there has been a significant shift in FDI in garment industry away from quota protected 
product lines and toward non-quota product lines. Through marketing links forged through 
foreign investors and international buyers, pure local firms also have made significant progress 
in movement ‘up market’.   Consequently, Sri Lanka’s expansion in export revenue reflected 
both volume expansion and increase in unit value, with the latter growing by 6.6 per cent per 
annum (Table 9).  In contrast, in other countries (such as China, Bangladesh Indonesia and 
Thailand), export revenue increase has come solely from  volume expansion in face of 
stagnation or decline in export unit value.  Unlike other South Asian countries where substantial 
segments of the domestic textile and clothing markets are highly protected, Sri Lanka has had a 
free trade regime for this sector for over two decades. This seems to have helped the local 
export industry to improve its international competitiveness. Exports from Sri Lanka, where 
internal prices are in line with prices in export markets, are likely to be less vulnerable to anti-
dumping and countervailing duty actions in importing countries than exports from countries 
with less open domestic markets (World Bank  2003, p 34). 
 
(C ) Employment 
 
In determining the effects of industrial growth on employment in Sri Lanka, one is handicapped by 
relatively poor data.  The coverage of the available employment and wage data is limited to 
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production units in the organized (formal) manufacturing sector.  Even for that sector, consistent 
data series of adequate length (encompassing both pre- and post-reform years) are not available. 
Nevertheless, several interesting facts emerge from the scanty data (Table 10). 
 
The post-reform years witnessed an impressive increase in manufacturing employment.  
According to data from the Annual Survey of Industry conducted by the Department of Census 
and Statistics (CDS), total employment in organized manufacturing (i.e., firms employing more 
than 5 workers) increased from 142 thousand in 1978 to over 500 thousand by the late 1990s 
(Table 10).  According to the CDS Labour Force Survey, the island-wide manufacturing 
employment increased from 648 thousand in 1985 to 788 by the mid-1990s and passed the one-
million mark in 2000. The share of manufacturing employment in total employment increased 
from around 10 per cent in the early 1980s to over 17 per cent by the end of 1990s (Table 11).  
Manufacturing sector contributed over 36 per cent of the increase in total employment in the 
economy between 1990/91 and 2001/02. The increase in manufacturing employment has come 
primarily from private sector manufacturing, in a context where employment in SOEs declined 
sharply, first because of output contraction caused by import competition and subsequently 
closing down and privatization.  
 
Export oriented manufacturing accounts for the bulk of new employment opportunities.  
Total local employment in export-oriented BOI firms increased from around 10 thousand in the 
early 1980s to over 416 thousand in 2002 (or 40 per cent of total manufacturing employment).    
The export oriented garment industry contributed to over 35 per cent of total employment in 
organized manufacturing by the mid-1990s.  This share has declined slowly in subsequent years 
reflecting the rapid expansion of other export-oriented industries such as rubber products, 
ceramics, and footwear and travel goods. The employment impact of new export oriented 
industries would look even more impressive if employment in small-scale manufacturing were 
appropriately accounted for. Many export-oriented firms in garments, toy and shoe industries 
have production subcontracting arrangements with small-scale producers in the unorganised 
sector. 
 
The increase in manufacturing employment has not been accompanied by an increase in 
real manufacturing wages. Real wages either declined or stagnated through out the post-reform 
period.  At the same time, labour productivity recorded (real value added per worker) 
impressive growth over this period. The combined outcome of these developments has 
somewhat shifted the distribution of total factor income in favour of the employers. The share of 
employee remuneration (wages and other benefits) in manufacturing value added declined from 
over 20 per cent in the early 1970s to about 17 per cent since the mid-1980s. These patterns in 
the distribution of factor income and the real wage behaviour are much in line with what the 
theory predicts about the process of industrial adjustment in a labour-surplus economy under 
export-led industrialisation.  
 
Even if the expansion of manufacturing worsened relative poverty though an increase in 
relative share of profits in total factor income as noted above,13 rapid manufacturing 
employment growth, coupled with the compositional changes in employment, would have led to 
a decline in absolute poverty. Reflecting the rapid expansion of export-oriented light 
manufacturing the share of female workers in total manufacturing employment increased from 
32 per cent in the early 1980s to over 60 percent by the mid 1999-00s.  There has also been a 
significant shift in the occupational composition in manufacturing, in favour of unskilled and 
                                                          
13  This is not a certainty given the high level of foreign capital participation in export-oriented industries. 
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semi-skilled workers.   Manual workers (unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers) accounted 
for over 90 per cent of total employment in BOI firms in 2002.14  
 
4. The Role of FDI 
Having averaged less than half a million a year during 1970-76, net FDI inflows increased 
rapidly in the post-reform period reaching US$ 64 million in 1982 (Table 12).  The outbreak of 
the war in 1983 severely disrupted this impressive trend and annual flows were only in the 
US$17-58 million. The second-wave reforms and the temporary cessation of hostilities during 
the first half of the 1990s witnessed a notable surge in FDI which increased to an all-time high 
of US$184 million in 1993. The relative contribution of net FDI inflows to private sector fixed 
capital formation increased from 0.1 per cent during 1970-77 to 5 per cent during 1978-89 and 
to over 12 per cent during 1990-94.   However, FDI inflows have declined since 1995 both in 
absolute terms and in relation to fixed capital formation.   This excludes the impact of a mild 
reversal in the declining trend since 2000, mostly reflecting increased inflows related to the 
privatization program.15    
 
Data relating to individual projects set up with FDI participation (henceforth referred to 
as ‘foreign firms’) points to a clear shift in FDI from domestic market-oriented to export-
oriented activities.  During 1967-77, a total of 82 foreign manufacturing firms were set up in Sri 
Lanka.  Of these, only 13 were export-oriented ventures (garments 9; gem cutting 2; ceramic-
ware 1; wall-tiles 1) (Athukorala 1995). In contrast, out of 2041 foreign firms set up during 
1978-2002, 1341 received approval under the BOI special incentive scheme for export-oriented 
firms.  These firms accounted for over 90 per cent of envisaged investment and employed of all 
projects. In addition, a considerable number of firms (over 125) approved under general 
incentive provisions are believed to export significant share of their output (Athukorala 1995). 
 
Standard labour intensive manufacturing has been the main attraction to foreign 
investors (Table 13), with a heavy concentration in the garment industry.  During the early 
stages, the dominant factor behind the surge of clothing exports through FDI participation was 
the quota restrictions imposed by the major importing countries on imports from “traditional” 
developing country producers in East Asia under the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA).  This 
was clearly evident from the predominance of firms from Hong Kong (the major developing-
country exporter of garments) in Sri Lanka’s export-oriented garment industry  
 
Since the later 1980s, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of foreign firms 
in other labour intensive activities, in particular footwear, travel goods, plastic products and 
diamond cutting and jewellery.  There has also been an increase in processing of primary 
products which were previously exported in raw form, notably rubber-based products (heavy 
duty tires, rubber bands and surgical gloves) and ceramics. Initially, the surge of FDI in the 
garment industry responded to the imposition by developed countries of quota restrictions on 
garment imports from traditional East Asian developing countries under the Multi-fibre 
Arrangement (MFA).  However, by 1983, garment exports from Sri Lanka also had come under 
quota restrictions, and the BOI stopped approval of new investors in quota restricted product 
categories and since then new foreign firms in garment industry have been predominantly 
involved in the production of non-quota garments have increased.  (According to BOI firm-level 
                                                          
14  Calculated using data provided by the Board of Investment. 
15 During 1999-2002, inflows relating to acquisitions accounted for over 30 per cent of net annual FDI 
inflows to Sri Lanka (calculations based data reported in the Annual Report of the Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka).  
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data there were 23 non-quota garment producing foreign firms which accounted for 10 per cent 
of total garment exports by BOI approved firms.  By 2002 these figures had increased to 36 and 
42 per cent respectively.   Another important recent development is the setting up of a number 
of yarn and textile producing factories by foreign firms to supply inputs to the garment industry. 
 
The investment promotion campaign of GCEC (and BOI) aimed at attracting FDI into 
assembly activities in high-tech industries (category 3 in Table 17).  However, it seems that the 
increase in political risk, following the eruption of the ethnic conflict in 1983, has prevented a 
positive response. Foreign firms involved in vertically integrated assembly activities, unlike 
those involved in light consumer goods industries, view investment risk from a long-term 
perspective because output disruption in a given location can disturb production plans for the 
entire production chain. In fact, two electronics multinationals, Motorola and Harris 
Corporation, abandoned plans to set up assembly plants in Sri Lanka in the early 1980s as the 
political climate begun to deteriorate.  There is evidence that there is something of a heard 
mentality in the site selection process of electronics multi-national firms, particularly if the first-
comer is a major player in the industry.   If the two projects of Motorola and Harris 
Corporations had been successful, other multinationals would have probably followed suit 
(Athukorala and Rajapatirana 2000, Snodgrass 1998).  Instead, today only a handful of small-
scale firms from Germany, USA, Japan and Korea are involved in electronics assembly 
activities in Sri Lanka.  
 
There is a close association between the growth of manufactured exports and the share 
of foreign firms (Table 14). The share of foreign firms in total manufacturing exports increased 
from 24 per cent in 1977 to over 65 per cent in the mid-1995.  Over 80 per cent of the total 
increment in export value (in US$ terms) between 1980-95 came from foreign firms.   There has 
been a decline in the FEI share in recent years, but still remained high at over 47 per cent by 
2002.    This decline mostly reflects the success of ‘pure’ local firms in expanding exports of 
standard light manufactured goods (mostly garments) benefiting from the market links 
established though their links with foreign firms (see below).   Foreign firms still dominate 
‘non-traditional’ product areas such as travel goods, heavy-duty tyres, surgical gloves and 
electronics assembly.  In 2002, these firms accounted for over 80 per cent of  total non-garment 
manufactured exports.16  
 
Apart from the ‘direct’ contribution captured in this data, there is evidence that the 
presence of foreign firms generates significant positive spillover effects on the export success of 
local export producing firms (Athukorala 1995). Apart from the ‘direct’ contribution captured in 
this data, there is evidence that the presence of foreign firms generates significant positive 
spillover effects on the export success of local export producing firms. Following the entry of 
foreign firms into clothing and other light consumer goods industries in Sri Lanka, many 
international buying groups which had long-established market links with these firms also set 
up buying offices in the country.  These buying offices have subsequently begun to play a 
crucial role in linking local firms with highly competitive international markets for these 
products.  Moreover, over 80 per cent of export-oriened foreign firms in Sri Lanka operate 
through joint ventures set up with local entrepreneurs. Local entrepreneurs seem to make use of 
joint-venture operations with foreign investors as a means of acquiring production and 
marketing skills required for the successful operation of their own (independent) production 
units (Athukorala 1995, Lal and Wignaraja 1992 ). There are also many cases of the local 
partner taking over the entire production operation and continue to thrive in export business 
after an initial stage of joint-venture operation.  What all the above reasoning suggests is that 
                                                          
16 Estimated using data provided by the Board of Investment. 
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the spill-over effects of the presence of foreign firms have, to a significant extent, contributed to 
the ‘export success’ of local firms.  
 
Sri Lanka’s heavy reliance on FDI for export expansion is in sharp contrast to the early 
experience of newly-industrialized countries (NIEs) in East Asia, in particular that of Taiwan, 
Korea and Hong Kong. The spectacular export take-off of these countries in the 1960s through 
labor-intensive exports was predominantly based on initiatives of indigenous firms (Nayyar 
1978).  This contrast does not, however, warrant the inference that Sri Lanka could have 
achieved export expansion through indigenous entrepreneurial capabilities under a restrictive 
policy towards FDI.  The important role played by foreign firms in export expansion is not a 
peculiar Sri Lankan phenomenon.  The available evidence for ‘second-tier’ exporting countries 
generally points to a close association between the degree of ‘foreign presence’ (as measured by 
the share of foreign firms in total manufactured exports) and export growth.  This close 
relationship can be explained in terms of at least two important recent developments in the 
process of internationalization of production.  First, from about the early 1970s, successful 
exporting firms in NIEs have begun to play an important role in labor-intensive export industries in 
second-tier exporting countries. Second, assembly activities in global industries, which are 
predominantly undertaken by setting up overseas production plants rather than through arms-length 
arrangement, have become increasingly important as an avenue for developing countries to 
participation in international production.  
 
Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2000) have undertaken an econometric analysis of the 
determinants of manufactured exports of Sri Lanka, with emphasis on the role of FDI. The 
results suggest that the significant involvement of foreign firms in export-oriented 
manufacturing contributed to a considerable weakening of the link between the real exchange 
rate and export performance.  International production location decisions of export-oriented 
foreign firms are mostly governed by the relative attractiveness of the country vis a vis other 
investment locations. This depends on the nature of the trade and investment regimes and the 
availability of required inputs (mostly labor) are the key considerations. The domestic incentive 
structure per se, that determines the relative profitability of exporting compared to selling 
domestically of a given host country is not the prime criterion.  Given this feature of the 
behaviour of foreign investors and their significant presence in domestic manufacturing, Sri 
Lanka has been able to achieve rapid export growth despite a less than satisfactory domestic 
incentive structure.  
 
5. Conclusions  
The liberalisation reforms initiated in 1977 have resulted on a significant opening of the Sri 
Lankan economy.  The reform process has been successful in virtually eliminating quantitative 
restrictions and reinforcing tariff as the main instruments for regulating import trade.  Tariff 
levels have also come down over the years and export producers have enjoyed duty free access 
to implored inputs from the very beginning of the reform process.  Liberalisation of the foreign 
investment regime has gone in hand in hand trade liberalisation.   These reforms have led to far-
reaching changes in the structure and performance of the manufacturing sector in the Sri Lankan 
economy. The manufacturing sector has become increasingly export-oriented, and it is no 
longer reliant on the fortunes of the traditional primary export industries to obtain required 
imported inputs.  With the gradual erosion of the dominant role of SOEs, the private sector has 
been largely responsible for growth of manufacturing in recent years. Despite some output 
disruption in the immediate aftermath of the removal of trade restrictions, the manufacturing 
sector has turned in an improved performance both in terms of output, productivity and 
employment, confounding the predictions of pessimists who expected trade liberalization to set 
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in a process of deindustrialization. The gains from export-oriented industrialization have been 
impressive enough to set the stage for bipartisan acceptance of an outward-oriented policy 
stance as the centrepiece of national development policy – a landmark development in Sri 
Lanka’s post-independence policy history.  
  
 It is important to note that what has been achieved in Sri Lanka under liberalization 
reforms occurred while civil war had been persisting for much of the period.  Quite apart from 
the direct debilitating effect of political risk on investor perception, the civil war hampered 
capturing the full benefits of economic opening through delays and inconsistencies in the 
implementation of reform process and macroeconomic instability emanating from massive war 
financing. In this context, the Sri Lankan experience with export-led industrialization so far can 
be explained as the joint outcome of trade liberalization that increased the potential returns to 
investments which capitalise on the country’s comparative advantage and investment 
liberalization that permitted the entry of international firms which have the capacity to take 
advantage of such profit opportunities.  Despite political risk and policy uncertainty, rapid 
export growth was consistent with this policy configuration as it ensured a handsome profit in 
labour-intensive export production in a labour abundant economy, which is usually 
characterized by a short payback period. Interestingly, the Sri Lankan experience over the past 
two decades has clearly demonstrated that an outward-oriented policy regime can yield a 
superior industrial outcome compared to a closed-economy regime, even under severe strains of 
political and macroeconomic instability.  
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Table 1: Import Duty Collection Rates* and the Share of Dutiable Imports, 1978-95 (percentages)  
 
 Import Duty rate1 Share of Dutiable Imports2
 Consumer goods Intermediate goods Capital goods Total imports  
1978-80 10.8 17.9 15.0 13.9 76.8 
1981-83 12.8 18.6 14.7 15.2 59.4 
1984-86 22.8 19.1 17.4 18.6 68.8 
1987-89 22.9 8.8 15.9 14.5 58.9 
1990 12.5 9.1 18.6 12.3 52.9 
1991 16.2 8.0 17.0 12.4 51.5 
1992 23.2 7.9 17.5 14.3 45.8 
1993 20.0 5.5 15.7 11.1 40.1 
1994 13.7 5.2 14.6 9.1 36.5 
1995 11.7 4.7 10.2 7.9 39.5 
1996 10.3 6.0 7.6 8.5 38.7 
1997 11.8 5.9 7.0 7.7 36.4 
1998 12.7 4.7 6.0 7.4 35.7 
1999 12.8 4.1 4.4 7.0 34.0 
2000 11.5 2.9 4.0 4.5 29.3 
2001 13.3 1.7 5.3 4.9 25.0 
2002 13.3 1.6 5.5 4.6 28.0 
Notes:   
1 Actual import duty (including surcharges and cesses)  as a  per centage of total import value (c.i.f).  
2 Total dutiable imports as a share of total imports. 
Source:  Compiled from Sri Lanka Customs Department, Customs Returns (for the period 1978- 1997) and Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual 
Report (various years).  
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Nominal and Effective Protection to Import-Competing Manufacturing, 1981, 1991, 1994 
and 2002 
ISIC 
No 
Industry 1981 1991 1994 2002 
  ERP NRP ERP NRP ERP NRP ERP 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 72 50 61 47 68 21 36 
32 Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products 78 45 58 46 84 25 54 
33 Wood, wood products and furniture 79 43 96 37 52 25 57 
34 Paper, paper products and printing  50 93 46 106 22 53 
35 Chemicals, rubber and plastic products 56 38 118 42 69 25 125 
36 Non-metallic mineral products  32 91 35 59 18 41 
37 Basic metal products 28 40 273 41 104 22 85 
38 Fabricated metal products, machinery and transport 
equipment 
107 48 132 45 95 25 86 
39 Other manufacturing  55 122 50 115 20 25 
3 Total manufacturing  90 45 77 43 70 23 56 
Notes: 
---  Not available. 
NRP Nominal protection rate:   The difference between domestic price and border (world) price as a percentage of the latter. 
EPR Effective protection rate: The percentage increase in value added under the existing trade policy intervention over value added at 
boarder price. 
 
Source:   Ministry of Finance (1994), (Table 5.4) (data for 1981 and 1994) and estimates provided by the Tariff Advisory Committee for the 
other two years. 
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Table 3:  Real Exchange Rate (RER) and its Components 
 
 NER WPI CPI RER 
1980 47.4 74.8 31.6 112.2
1981 51.9 80.6 37.2 112.4
1982 52.6 83.0 41.2 105.8
1983 57.3 84.9 47.0 103.5
1984 58.9 87.4 54.8 93.9
1985 61.4 88.6 55.6 97.7
1986 68.2 87.2 60.1 98.9
1987 75.1 88.7 64.7 103.0
1988 83.2 91.8 73.8 103.5
1989 89.3 95.9 82.3 104.1
1990 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991 101.2 103.1 112.2 93.1
1992 107.6 105.7 125.0 91.0
1993 116.2 108.2 139.6 90.0
1994 121.4 110.9 151.4 88.9
1995 130.1 115.2 163.1 91.9
1996 134.0 117.5 189.0 83.3
1997 139.4 118.9 207.1 80.0
1998 149.0 118.9 226.5 78.2
1999 166.2 120.1 237.2 84.2
2000 179.3 125.4 251.8 89.3
2001 199.9 127.2 287.5 88.5
2002 214.5 126.4 314.9 86.1
2003 232.3 129.0 327.3 91.6
 
Notes: 
 
NER: Trade weighted nominal exchange rate vis a vis the five major trading partner countries 
WPI: Trade weighted wholesale price of the five major trading partner countries 
CPI: Domestic (Sri Lanka) consumer price index. 
RER: Real exchange rate (= [NER*WPI]/CPI 
 
Trade weight used in compiling NER and WPI relate to the year 2002. 
 
Source:  Compiled from Central Bank of  Sri Lanka, Annual Report (various issues). 
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Table 4:  Key Indicators of Manufacturing Performance, 1965-961 (percentages 
 
 GDP 
growth 
Growth of 
value added 
Share in 
GDP 
Capacity 
utilization 
Export growth3 Export-output ratio 
1950-59 3.7 1.3 7.2 --- --- --- 
1960-64 4.5 7.8 6.2 --- --- --- 
1965-69 4.9 11.5 10.6   --- ---  --- 
1970-76 2.9 3.6 11.4 54 68.4 4.1 
1978-80 6.1 6.3 11.2 72 55.8 18.4 
1981-83 5.3 5.2 11.1 75 17.3 27.9 
1984-86 4.8 9.3 12.1 75 18.1 35.0 
1987-89 2.1 6.3 13.7 79 11.1 41.1 
1990-92 5.0 10.4 16.2 82 24.6 50.8 
1993-95 6.0 9.2 17.7 84 10.2 62.5 
1996 3.8 7.2 16.5 83 18.1 60.3 
1997 6.3 10.0 16.6 84 15.0 62.9 
1998 4.7 7.5 16.8 84 6.1 63.4 
1999 4.3 4.5 16.4 83 -2.2 63.0 
2000 6.0 10.0 16.8 85 19.1 70.4 
2001 -1.5 -3.8 16.0 80 -11.9 66.6 
2002 4.0 2.6 15.9 81 -2.3 63.4 
2003 5.5 5.1 15.6 --- --- --- 
Notes 
1. Capacity utilization and export output ratio relates to ‘organized’ manufacturing only.  Others are economy-wide indicators. 
2. Manufacturing excluding primary processing of plantation crops. 
3. In current US$  terms, excluding petroleum products.  
--- Data not available 
 
Source:  Complied from Central Bank, Review of the Economy and Annual Report (various issues). 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG) to Output Growth  in Private Sector Manufacturing 
* 
 
 Go Contribution of : TFPG 
  Labour 
(SL*GL) 
Capital 
(SK*GK)
Intermediate inputs 
(SM*GM) 
 
1966-1974 0.8 0.5 -1.3 4.6 -3.0 
1974-1981 4.0 0.2 3.0 1.6 -0.8 
1981-1988 14.0 0.6 3.6 8.5 1.2 
1988-1995 17.4 1.5 4.9 1.3 9.7 
1995-2000 3.5 -0.1 0.7 1.8 1.2 
1981-2000 12.5 0.7 3.3 4.1 4.3 
Notes: 
 
*   Estimated using the formula: 
  
TFPG  =  GO  -  SL GL -   SK GK - SMGM 
 
where, TFPG is total factor productivity growth; GO, GL, GK, GM denotes annual compound growth of gross output, labour, stock of capital and 
intermediate input between the two given years; and SL , SK and SM  denote the average value shares of labour, capital and material in output. 
 
Source:  Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2000), Table 8.1, updated using the same methodology and data sources.  
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Table 6:  Sectoral composition of Manufacturing Output (Value Added) and Employment1,  
1981, 1988, 1995 and 2000 (percentages) 
 
  Value added Employment 
  1981 1988 1995 2000 1981 1988 1995 2000 
311/12 Food 8.1 25.5 15.0 17.4 5.4 15.3 12.1 15.9 
313 Beverages 1.4 13.1 11.1 9.2 1.1 2.3 1.1 1.0 
314 Tobacco 19 1.7 11.2 13.8 2.6 3.3 5.9 5.1 
321 Textile 8.9 10.3 9.4 11.0 24.0 18.5 14.2 15.1 
322 Clothing 21.6 12.9 19.4 19.4 29.3 23.0 35.4 31.0 
323 Leather goods 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 
324 Footwear 1.2 1.8 2.3 2.0 1.2 2.0 1.8 2.0 
331 Wood products 0.3 1.3 1.1 0.5 0.7 2.8 1.6 1.7 
332 Furniture 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.4 
341 Paper and paper products 1.3 3.3 1.3 2.0 1.4 2.1 0.9 1.3 
342 Printing and publishing 1.2 1.9 1.4 0.7 1.7 3.2 1.9 2.0 
351 Industrial chemicals 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 
352 Other chemical 10.8 3.9 5.2 3.3 5.6 1.7 1.4 1.5 
355 Rubber goods 6.6 5.0 5.7 5.6 6.1 4.1 4.3 5.0 
356 Plastic goods 3 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.8 2.9 1.6 1.8 
361 Pottery 0.9 2.3 1.6 1.1 1.0 3.0 2.0 1.8 
362 Glass and glass products 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.2 
369 Non-metallic mineral products 0.6 4.8 2.7 2.9 1.4 6.0 3.8 3.7 
371 Iron and steel basic industries 0.5 1.1 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.2 
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries  0.0 0.3 0.0  0.0 0.1 0.1 
381 Fabricated metal products 2.8 1.7 1.2 0.8 3.7 0.7 1.4 1.6 
382 Non-electrical machinery 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.8 2.4 0.9 1.0 1.3 
383 Electrical machinery 4 0.0 1.5 1.7 2.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 
384 Transport equipment 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.9 1.2 2.6 1.2 1.0 
385 Professional equipment   0.1 0.1   0.1 0.1 
390 Other manufacturing 1.5 4.0 3.3 2.0 2.1 2.4 4.9 3.0 
Total   100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100 
 Notes:  
1 Excluding petroleum refining.  
2 Jewelry, sport goods, toys etc.  
  
Source: Compiled from Department of Census and Statistics (DCS), Annual Survey of Industries,  Colombo: DCS. 
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Table 7:   Growth of   Manufacturing Gross Output and Total factor Productivity   
 
  Output growth Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG) 
      1974-81 1981-88 1988-95 1995-2000 1974-81   1981-88 1988-95 1995-2000
 Food         6.9 29.5 14.4 4.6 0.5 2.3 4.4 -3.7
313          Beverages -4.1 22.0 29.7 -2.8 -4.9 5.9 20.3 -12.4
314          Tobacco 1.2 11.4 3.5 3.1 0.7 0.0 6.7 0.8
321          Textile -4.0 10.1 29.2 6.0 -1.6 0.5 11.6 7.8
322          Clothing 24.2 11.4 24.2 5.2 1.7 -2.0 13.2 5.2
323          Leather goods -2.5 -5.1 47.4 0.6 0.4 -2.4 14.9 5.2
324          Footwear -2.3 18.8 25.6 3.4 1.4 0.6 11.8 1.4
331          Wood products 7.5 12.0 31.2 -5.0 -1.9 2.1 8.6 -8.5
332          Furniture 5.9 6.7 23.1 4.8 1.1 -1.4 1.8 1.7
341          Paper and paper products -8.2 11.6 18.1 18.1 0.2 0.4 5.6 2.9
342          Printing and publishing 22.6 10.4 -1.7 -0.3 5.7 -1.1
351          Industrial chemicals -5.3 10.6 30.1 4.8 -1.9 -7.1 19.7 -3.9
352          Other chemical 5.8 6.9 16.6 -1.1 -6.3 -1.3 18.9 -3.4
355          Rubber goods 16.6 -3.7 38.9 0.7 -2.9 -4.9 16.6 1.0
356          Plastic goods 5.5 7.8 20.7 4.2 -8.8 1.4 12.7 1.8
361         Pottery 5.2 19.3 6.6 -3.2 0.2 -2.6 -8.5 -3.6
362 Glass and glass products 4.8 6.2 -9.5 13.8 5.8 -0.3 -19.8 11.4 
369 Non-metallic mineral products -8.3 34.4 6.8 4.1 3.2 2.3 -11.9 -0.5 
371 Iron and steel basic industries 3.8 9.0 17.4 1.5 0.3 1.0 9.7 -9.0 
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries    -18.3    -12.0 
381 Fabricated metal products -3.4 8.3 15.9 -0.3 -3.8 2.2 8.7 0.3 
382          Non-electrical machinery -16.2 -14.0 55.2 12.0 -7.8 -0.1 18.2 1.9
383          Electrical machinery -2.5 -0.7 20.4 6.7 -6.2 -1.4 12.2 2.2
384          Transport equipment -14.4 20.1 18.2 -0.7 -2.4 1.6 7.0 7.6
          Professional equipment 5.9 -8.4
390          Other manufacturing 8.3 29.4 19.6 -13.9 -8.2 4.2 8.9 -2.7
 Total manufacturing         4.0 14.0 20.0 3.5 -0.8 1.2 8.6 1.1
 
Notes:  See Table 5 
Source:  Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2000), Table 8.2, updated using the same methodology and data sources.  
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Table 8:  Composition and Growth of Merchandise Exports, 1975–2002 
  
 Composition1 (%)  Growth2 (%) 
 1975/76 1980/81 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 2001/2 1975-89 1990-2000 1975-02 
Primary products 85.5 67.1 57.1 42.0 29.9 22.8 2.5 3.7 2.7 
    Tea 46.0 32.7 29.7 23.6 13.9 14.2 1.7 5.5 3.0 
    Rubber 17.4 14.2 7.3 3.6 2.0 0.5 -1.3 -9.6 -0.5 
    Coconut products 11.0 6.9 7.2 3.6 2.2 1.7 0.6 3.5 0.1 
Manufactured goods including petroleum
product 14.5 32.9 42.9 58.0 70.1 77.2 17.2 10.6 15.1 
Petroleum products 9.7 16.9 8.9 4.6 2.2 1.5 1.7 0.5 0.5 
Manufactured exports excluding
petroleum products 4.8 16.1 34.0 53.4 67.9 75.7 25.4 11.1 19.1 
    Food, excluding fish 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.3 1.9 12.1 19.7 17.3 
    Fish products 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.8 9.1 1.1 4.7 
    Textile 0.2 0.4 1.1 1.6 3.8 4.1 25.3 16.4 22.4 
    Clothing 1.0 12.2 24.1 35.2 40.0 48.1 32.4 10.8 26.6 
    Footwear 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.5 23.8 10.3 20.1 
    Ceramics 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9  14.2 14.2*
    Rubber goods 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 4.1 3.7  11.9 11.9*
    Cut/polished Diamond 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 4.0 3.8  3.2 3.2* 
    Non-electrical machinery 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.3 2.2 16.7 18.8 17.1 
    Electrical machinery 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.5 3.2 28.8 23.2 21.0 
    Travel goods 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.4 1.7 23.2 38.4 20.8 
    Toys and sport goods 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.0 30.4 19.6 20.6 
    Jewellery  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.3 19.5 5.5 17.9 
    Other manufactured goods 1.6 0.8 5.4 11.8 6.0 3.5 38.1 11.9 14.6 
Total exports 100 100 100 100 100 100    
     US$ million 567.5 1078.8 1274.5 1950.1 3955.1 4758.8 6.9 8.5 8.6 
  
Notes:   
(1) Computed for two-year average exports    
(2)  Annual compound rates estimated by fitting a logarithmic trend. 
• Estimates for 1990-2002. 
Source:  Compiled from, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report (various Years) 
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Table 9:   Value, Volume and Unit value of Garments Exports from Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, 1985-20011 
 
       Bangladesh China Indonesia Sri Lanka Thailand
 Value Volume Unit value Value Volume Unit value Value Volume Unit value Value Volume Unit value Value Volume Unit value 
1985            16 --- --- --- --- --- 17 30 58 47 71 66 34 64 54 
1986                19 42 46 --- --- --- 27 42 64 55 93 59 44 73 60
1987                46 69 66 57 126 45 34 44 78 72 103 70 67 89 76
1988                66 65 102 68 149 46 44 51 87 73 95 77 78 93 84
1989                67 77 86 83 97 86 70 88 79 84 97 86 89 96 92
1990                100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1991                119 109 109 129 87 148 138 123 112 121 110 110 124 106 116
1992                146 135 108 174 276 63 190 157 121 177 147 120 117 113 103
1993                194 194 100 190 316 60 207 187 111 201 180 112 121 111 110
1994                205 218 94 248 387 64 185 168 110 219 204 107 119 124 96
1995                269 275 98 239 386 62 182 174 105 214 195 110 108 140 77
1996                294 318 92 248 398 62 200 188 106 221 188 118 83 140 59
1997                408 584 70 304 449 68 164 182 90 250 201 125 82 142 58
1998                603 569 96 294 490 60 142 155 92 291 227 128 88 124 71
1999                --- --- 0 308 524 59 205 264 78 325 249 130 89 120 75
2000                --- --- 0 370 652 57 263 289 91 359 271 133 96 118 82
2001                682 717 95 378 754 50 246 300 82 337 271 124 103 106 96
Growth4 
(%t) 
24.02 21.22 0.22 13.53 15.13 -1.53 11.3         11.6 0.2 12.2 8.3 3.8 0.6 2.2 -1.6
(t ratio) (2.9)* (20.9)**              (0.1) (13.6)** (8.1)** (0.8) (5.2)** (8.1)** (0.3) (14.2)** (12.0)** (6.6)** (0.5) (3.2)* (-1.3)
Notes 
(1) The data reported in the Table cover exports of garments belonging to three SITC 3-digit categories (Men's and Boy's outwear, textile fabrics not knitted or crocheted (SITC 842), Women, girls, infants 
outwear, not knitted or crocheted (843), and Outwear knitted or crocheted (845)).  
(2) For the period 1986-99.    (3)   For the period 1987-2001. 
(3) Growth rate estimated by fitting a logarithmic trend line.  T-ratios are given in bracket, with the statistical significance denoted as:  * 5-percent, ** one-percent. 
  ---   Data not available. 
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Table 10:  Manufacturing Employment and Related data 
 
 
Employment (no of workers) 
 
 
Real earning per 
worker 
Labour 
productivity 
(1980-=100) 
Wage share in 
value added 
(%) 
 CDS QLS CDS- MFS SOE BOI RE RLP E/Vad 
1978  142347 63530 261 118.3 96.6 26.6 
1979  160816 75150 5876 111.8 85.7 28.01 
1980  161844 70371 10538 100.0 100.0 25.7 
1981  151549 66355 19727 95.0 112.2 24.2 
1982   71255 24926 80.9 97.3 19.4 
1983  202100 70182 27805 81.1 121.3 17.9 
1984  212332 64292 32725 83.6 110.4 17.6 
1985 648000 210465 58446 35786 101.5 135.1 17.3 
1986  217146 54332 45047 101.7 131.5 17.2 
1987  212223 54049 50743 105.8 130 16.7 
1988  219278 52050 54626 105.9 137.3 17.6 
1989  243705 52611 61429 100.1 134.2 17.5 
1990 669000 281114 45283 71358 95.0 137.8 17.6 
1991 751000 315582 40066 85457 102.5 142.7 19.5 
1992 650000 289155 41394 104220 100.4 160.1 19.3 
1993 684000 356950 39902 122165 106.6 165.0 20.8 
1994 756000 520596 36714 205660 92.3 149.6 20.5 
1995 788000 514561 40436 223367 94.0 148.0 20.0 
1996 807000 499052 40175 241970 88.6 151.8 19.1 
1997 920000 458032 38804 285663 87.7 165.2 17.7 
1998 858000 462358 37698 294381 88.4 173.6 17.8 
1999 902000 469132 36154 327059 92.5 181.3 17.5 
2000 1045000 500366 33947 367849 93.6 164.7 19.5 
2001 1057000  33513 386034    
2002 1092000  32614 416756    
 
Sources and Notes: 
 
CDS QLS:   Data from the quarterly labour force survey conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics  (cover total manufacturing 
employment)  
CDS ASI Data from the Annual Survey of Industry conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics  (cover employment in firms 
employing more than 5 workers) 
SOE Employment in state-owned manufacturing enterprises, from Central bank Annual Report (various issues). 
BOI Employment in  firms set up under section 17 of the BOI Law. 
 
Real earning per worker,  real labour productivity and wage share in value added were compiled using data from the  Department of Census 
and Statistics, Annual Survey of Industry (various issues) 
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Table 11:  Sectoral Composition of  Employment ( per cent) 
 
 Source* Agriculture Industry Services 
   Total Manufacturing  
1963 Census of population, DCS 52.6 12.1 9.1 35.3 
1971 Census of population, DCS 50.1 12.5 9.3 37.4 
1981 Census of population, CDS 45.3 14.1 10.1 40.7 
1981/82 Consumer Finance and Socio Economic Survey, CBSL 50.5 19.0 12.3 30.4 
1985/86 Labour Force and Socio Economic Survey, DCS 49.3 18.4 12.6 32.3 
1986/87 Labour Force and Socio Economic Survey,  DCS 47.7 21.0 13.4 31.3 
1990 Quarterly labour force Survey, DCS 46.8 18.7 13.3 34.5 
1992 Quarterly labour force Survey, DCS 42.1 19.5 13.1 38.4 
1994 Quarterly labour force Survey, DCS 39.5 19.2 14.3 41.3 
1996 Quarterly labour force Survey, CDS 37.3 21.7 14.7 41.0 
1998 Quarterly labour force Survey, DCS 36.2 21.9 14.8 41.9 
2000 Quarterly labour force Survey, DCS 37.4 24.5 17.2 38.1 
2002 Quarterly labour force Survey, DCS 34.1 21.2 16.8 45.8 
 
Note: * DCS      Department of Census and Statistics        CBSL     Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
Table 12: Net Foreign Direct Investment (NDFI) Inflow to Sri Lanka 
 
 NFDI, US$ million NFDI as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic capital Formation 
1970-751 0.4 0.2 
1976 0.2 0.0 
1977 1.2 0.3 
1978 1.5 0.6 
1979 46.9 10.6 
1980 43 7.8 
1981 49.3 8.6 
1982 63.6 9.1 
1983 37.8 5.4 
1984 32.6 4.5 
1985 24.8 3.8 
1986 29.2 4.0 
1987 58.2 8.2 
1988 46.6 5.7 
1989 17.6 2.3 
1990 42.5 2.9 
1991 100 5.6 
1992 119.2 9.4 
1993 183.8 2.4 
1994 158.2 1.8 
1995 16.2 1.7 
1996 86.3 4.1 
1997 129.2 13.6 
1998 137.2 5.6 
1999 176.8 4.7 
2000 172.7 4.3 
2001 82.1 5.7 
2002 229.8 7.3 
2003 225.7 6.3 
 
Source:  Compiled from, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report (various Years) 
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Table 13:  Industry Compotation of Export Oriented Foreign Manufacturing Firms1, 1982, 1995 
and 2002  
 
  1982  1995  2002  
  No of firms Export (%) No of firms Export (%) No of firms Export % 
  4 3.3 58 11.5 151 16.4 
1 Food and beverages   15  61 2.1 
1.1 Tobacco   2  2 2.2 
1.2 Natural rubber-based products 1 2.8 16 3.2 28 9.3 
1.3 Ceramics/granite products 1 0.2 10 2.3 23 2.0 
1.4 Coir products 1 0.3 6 0.5 20 0.5 
1.5 Wood products   2 0.1 7 0.1 
1.6 Gem cutting   7 0.2 6 0.1 
1.7 Other     4 0.0 
2 Standardized consumer goods 27 94.9 155 79.6 321 71.1 
2.1 Textile and garments 21 86.9 81 59.4 152 51.6 
2.1a Handloom and textile products 0 0 8 8.1 15 6.0 
2.1b Textile fabric, knitted and woven 3 1.1 10 9.5 23 6.3 
2.1c Garments 18 85.8 63 41.8 114 39.2 
2.3 Leather goods 1  7 3 6 0.3 
2.4 Plastic goods 1 0.4 16 2.8 30 2.1 
2.5 Footwear 2 1 6 2.5 5 1.3 
2.6 Sport goods   31 2.8 21 4.9 
2.7 Diamond cutting and jewelry 2 6.6 17 8.9 21 3.4 
2.7 Other   7 1.2 86 7.4 
3 Component production/assembly 3 1.8 32 8.9 97 12.5 
3.1 Electronics and electrical goods 1 1.6 19 4.2 19 5.6 
3.2 
Fabricated metal products, and  machinery
and transport equipment 2 0.2 1.3 4.7 78 6.9 
 Total Foreign 34 100 303 100 569 100 
 
Note: 1. Firm approved under Section 17 (special export provision) of BOI Law. 
Source:  Complied from official records ob the Board of Investment. 
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Table 14:  Foreign Firms’ Contribution to Manufactured Export Expansion, 1976-1995 (Three-year 
averages) 
 
 Manufactured exports  
 US$ mn 
Average annual 
growth 
Manufacturing share 
in total merchandise 
exports 
Share of foreign firms  
in manufactured 
 exports 
    Mf exports 
1975-77 25 14.5 4.0 23.2 
1978-80 103 63.6 10.4 30.2 
1981-83 235 23.0 22.1 43.7 
1984-86 421 24.1 31.9 47.4 
1987-89 654 14.8 44.2 58.2 
1990-92 1083 32.8 56.6 65.8 
1993-95 2248 13.5 71.8 62.3 
1996-98 3269 13.1 72.2 46.1 
1999-01 3750 1.7 75.6 47.5 
2002 3562 -2.3 75.7 47.0 
 
Source: Athukorala (1995), Table 4, updated to 1995 using the same data sources. 
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